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Abstract
Ad hoc networks rely on the cooperation of the nodes par-
ticipating in the network to forward packets for each other.
A node may decide not to cooperate to save its resources
while still using the network to relay its traffic. If too
many nodes exhibit this behavior, network performance
degrades and cooperating nodes may find themselves un-
fairly loaded. Most previous efforts to counter this be-
havior ([4],[5],[6],[21]) have relied on further cooperation
between nodes to exchange reputation information about
other nodes. If a node observes another node not partici-
pating correctly, it reports this observation to other nodes
who then take action to avoid being affected and poten-
tially punish the bad node by refusing to forward its traffic.
Unfortunately, such second-hand reputation information is
subject to false accusations and requires maintaining trust
relationships with other nodes. The objective of OCEAN is
to avoid this trust-management machinery and see how far
we can get simply by using direct first-hand observations
of other nodes’ behavior. We find that, in many scenarios,
OCEAN can do as well as, or even better than, schemes
requiring second-hand reputation exchanges. This encour-
aging result could possibly help obviate solutions requiring
trust-management for some contexts.
1 Introduction
An ad hoc network is a group of wireless mobile computers
(or nodes), in which nodes cooperate by forwarding packets
for each other to allow them to communicate beyond direct
wireless transmission range. Ad hoc networks require no
centralized administration or fixed network infrastructure
such as base stations or access points, and can be quickly
and inexpensively set up as needed. They can be used in
scenarios in which no infrastructure exists, or in which the
existing infrastructure does not meet application require-
ments for reasons such as security or cost.
So far, applications of mobile ad hoc networks have been
envisioned mainly for crisis solutions (e.g., in the battle-
field or in rescue operations). In these applications, all the
nodes of the network belong to a single authority (e.g. a
single military unit or a rescue team) and have a common
goal. For this reason, the nodes are naturally motivated
to cooperate.
With the progress of technology, however, it is becom-
ing possible to deploy mobile ad hoc networks for civilian
applications as well. Examples include networks of cars,
provision of communication facilities in remote areas, and
exploiting the density in urban areas of existing nodes such
as cellular telephones to offload or otherwise avoid using
base stations. In these networks, the nodes may not be-
long to a single authority and they do not pursue a com-
mon goal. In addition, these networks could be larger,
have a longer lifetime, and they could be completely self-
organizing, meaning that the network could be run solely
by the operation of the end-users. In such networks, there
is no good reason to assume that the nodes cooperate. In-
deed, the contrary is true: some nodes may be disruptive
and others may attempt to save resources (e.g. battery
power, memory, CPU cycles) through “selfish” behavior.
In this paper we describe OCEAN, in which we focus
on the robustness of packet forwarding: maintaining the
overall packet throughput of an ad hoc network in the face
of nodes that misbehave at the routing layer. We concen-
trate our efforts at the routing layer and do not attempt to
address attacks at lower layers (eg. jamming the network
channel) or passive attacks like eaves-dropping. We also
do not deal (much) with issues like node authentication,
securing routes, or message encryption. Instead, secure
routing protocols [14],[15],[22],[25] are designed to combat
those threats. OCEAN addresses an orthogonal issue – the
encouragement of proper routing participation – and can
be used in addition to secure routing protocols to respond
to a more complete threat model. We also do not con-
sider the collusion of nodes in a network, but merely the
individual bad behavior of nodes.
OCEAN considers two types of routing misbehavior.
The first, which we call misleading, is that a node may re-
spond positively to route requests but then fail to forward
the actual packets, misleading other nodes into unsuccess-
fully sending their traffic through it. Previous approaches
at mitigating misleading routing misbehavior [4],[5],[6],[21]
require nodes in the network to exchange reputation in-
formation about other nodes. If a node observes another
node participating incorrectly, it reports this observation
to other nodes who then take action to avoid being affected
by the misbehavior and perhaps even punish the node by
refusing to forward its traffic.
While these schemes have proved effective, exchanging
second-hand reputation information opens up a new vul-
nerability, since nodes may falsely accuse other nodes of
misbehaving. Making a decision about whether to believe
an accusation requires authenticating and trusting the ac-
cusing node. Such trust maintenance could be performed
offline or could be bootstrapped during network opera-
tions. In the former case, the network requires a priori
trust relationships that may not be practical in truly ad
hoc networks. In the latter case, bootstrapping trust rela-
tionships in ad hoc networks involves significant complex-
ity and risk and may not be reasonable for a very dynamic
or short-lived network.
OCEAN’s approach to this problem is to disallow any
second-hand reputation exchanges. Instead, a node makes
routing decisions based solely on direct observations of its
neighboring nodes’ exchanges with it. This eliminates most
trust management complexity, albeit at a cost of less infor-
mation with which to make decisions about node behavior.
To our surprise, though, we find that less information does
not necessarily mean less performance. Using OCEAN we
are able to achieve performance (packet throughput) com-
parable to that of approaches requiring second-hand infor-
mation exchanges. On the positive side, OCEAN achieves
this while being less complex and less vulnerable to false
accusations. On the negative side, OCEAN is more sensi-
tive to some parameter settings and does not punish mis-
behaving nodes as severely as systems using full-blown rep-
utation information.
The second type of routing misbehavior we address,
which we call selfish, is that a node may not even respond
to route requests but may nonetheless send its own traf-
fic through the network, unfairly preserving its resources
while exploiting others’. This type of misbehavior can be
hard to detect, except through observing the actual data
forwarding behavior of neighboring nodes. In OCEAN,
we again focus on detecting this misbehavior with only
direct observations of neighboring nodes. We address the
problem using simple, light-weight economic methods that,
while not guaranteed to be fair, nonetheless generally re-
sult in reasonable performance.
Section 2 describes recent work related to the problem of
managing misbehavior at the routing layer in ad hoc net-
works. Section 3 presents an overview of the modules used
in OCEAN to mitigate such routing misbehavior. Section 4
describes a scheme to deter selfish behavior. Section 5 dis-
cusses the simulation results we obtained and compares
OCEAN to reputation-based approaches. Section 6 gives
more detail about node authentication issues in OCEAN.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Work
Recently, the problem of security and cooperation enforce-
ment has received considerable attention by researchers in
the ad hoc network community.
The problem of securing the routing layer using crypto-
graphically secure messages is addressed by Hu et al. [14]
[15], Papadimitratos and Haas [22], and Sanzgiri et al. [25].
Schemes to handle authentication in ad hoc networks as-
suming trusted Certificate Authorities have been proposed
by Zhou and Haas [29], and Kong et al. [19]. Hubaux et
al. [16] employ a self-organized PGP-based scheme to au-
thenticate nodes using chains of certificates and transitiv-
ity of trust. Stajano and Anderson [26] authenticate users
by ‘imprinting,’ in analogy to ducklings acknowledging the
first moving subject they see as their mother. In OCEAN,
we do not attempt to secure the routing layer, although our
techniques may be used in conjunction with many secure
routing protocols to increase performance and robustness.
In contrast to securing the routing layer of ad hoc
networks, some researchers have also focused on simply
detecting and reporting misleading routing misbehavior.
Watchdog and Pathrater [21] use observation-based tech-
niques to detect misbehaving nodes and report observed
misbehavior back to the source of the traffic. Pathrater
manages trust and route selection based on these reports.
This allows nodes to choose better paths along which
to route their traffic by routing around the misbehaving
nodes. However, the scheme does not punish malicious
nodes; instead, they are relieved of their forwarding bur-
den.
CONFIDANT [4] also detects misleading nodes by
means of observation and more aggressively informs other
nodes of this misbehavior through reports sent around the
network. Each node in the network hosts a monitor for
observations, reputation records for first-hand and trusted
second-hand reports, trust records to control the trust as-
signed to received warnings, and a path manager used by
nodes to adapt their behavior according to reputation in-
formation. In more recent work [5] [6], these researchers
find that reputation schemes can be beneficial for fast
misbehavior detection, but only when one can deal with
false accusations, for which they propose a solution using
Bayesian statistics. Our goal is to avoid the machinery for
managing these reports and their associated trust issues
entirely.
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks face a similar situation in
which they rely on cooperation among self interested users.
Recent studies have modelled and quantified the incen-
tives and disincentives for cooperation in P2P networks
([12],[20]). These results generally appear to support the
feasibility of the approach.
Researchers have also investigated means of discourag-
ing selfish routing behavior in ad hoc networks, generally
through payment schemes [7],[8],[17]. These approaches
either require the use of tamper-proof hardware modules
or central bankers to do the accounting securely, both of
which may not be appropriate in some truly ad hoc net-
work scenarios. In the per-hop payment scheme proposed
by Buttyan and Hubaux [8], the payment units are called
nuglets and reside in a secure tamper-proof module in each
node. They find that given such a module, increased coop-
eration is beneficial not only for the entire network but also
for individual nodes. We rely on much of their work and
likewise use a payment scheme. In our simple “chipcount”
mechanism, further described in Section 4, each node keeps
track of the number of packets it has forwarded for its di-
rect neighbors and expects corresponding willingness from
those neighbors to carry its traffic. The scheme can result
in unfairness to some hosts, but its simplicity and perfor-
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mance may be appropriate in some scenarios.
3 Overview of OCEAN
OCEAN is a layer that resides between the network and
MAC layers of the protocol stack, and it helps nodes make
intelligent routing and forwarding decisions. We have de-
signed OCEAN on top of the Dynamic Source Routing
Protocol (DSR) [18], although many of its principles may
also be useful in other ad hoc routing protocols. In this
section we describe the components of OCEAN that de-
tect and mitigate misleading routing behavior. Section 4
describes our techniques for mitigating selfish behavior.
The OCEAN layer, which may reside on each node in
the network, hosts five components:
NeighborWatch: This module observes the behav-
ior of the neighbors of a node. It relies on the omni-
directional nature of the antenna and assumes symmet-
ric bi-directional links. In particular, it tracks misleading
routing misbehavior. When forwarding a packet, the mod-
ule buffers the packet checksum, and then monitors the
wireless channel after sending the packet to its neighbor. If
it does not hear the neighbor attempt to forward the packet
within a timeout (default 1ms), NeighborWatch registers
a negative event against the neighbor node and removes
the checksum from its buffer. On the other hand, on over-
hearing a forwarding attempt by the neighbor, Neighbor-
Watch compares the packet to the buffered checksum, and
if it matches, it registers a positive event and removes the
checksum from its buffer. If the checksum does not match,
it treats the packet as not having been forwarded. These
events are communicated to the RouteRanker, which main-
tains ratings of the neighbor nodes.
The NeighborWatch module is not a guaranteed service.
It suffers from all the same potential errors as the Watch-
dog [21], including, for example, the fact that observing
a neighbor forwarding a packet does not guarantee that
the packet is successfully received by the next node in the
route.
NeighborWatch on a node tracks only this one type of
behavior with neighbors directly interacting with it. There
are many other events among neighbors that Neighbor-
Watch could potentially track, but they are subject to too
many vulnerabilities and thus become more complex to
analyze. For instance, NeighborWatch on a node A could
observe the success and failure rates of its neighbors at-
tempting to forward traffic between themselves. Failure of
a neighbor, B, to forward a packet from some other neigh-
bor, C, could trigger a negative event registration against
B on A. Unfortunately, only B knows for sure whether its
refusal to forward C’s traffic is due to misleading behav-
ior on B’s part or is instead B’s legitimate response to C’s
previous misbehavior toward B.
RouteRanker: Every node maintains ratings for each
of its neighboring nodes. The rating is initialized to Neu-
tral and is incremented and decremented on receiving pos-
itive and negative events respectively from the Neighbor-
Watch component. We have found that the system per-
Neutral Rating 0
Positive Step +1
Negative Step -2
Faulty Threshold -40
Table 1: Default OCEAN Parameters
forms more satisfactorily when the absolute value of the
negative decrement is larger than the positive increment.
Once the rating of a node falls below a certain thresh-
old, Faulty Threshold, the node is added to a faulty list.
The faulty list represents a list of all observed misbehav-
ing nodes. A route is rated good or bad, based on whether
the next hop in the route belongs to the faulty list or not.
One can imagine a finer ranking between routes, where
good routes are further differentiated, but our simple bi-
nary discrimination between good and bad routes proves
to be reasonably effective. The default parameters we use
in OCEAN are tabulated in Table 1.
Rank-Based Routing: The Rank-Based Routing
module applies the information from NeighborWatch in
the actual selection of routes. To make it possible to
avoid routes containing nodes in the faulty list, we add
a variable-length field to the DSR Route-Request Packet
(RREQ) called the avoid-list. The avoid list is a list of
nodes that the RREQ transmitter wishes to avoid in its
future routes. On re-broadcasting an RREQ, a node ap-
pends its faulty list to the avoid list of the RREQ packet.
Any node receiving an RREQ checks the RREQ avoid list.
Depending upon the avoid list and the RREQ-route, a
node decides whether to suppress the RREQ, or honor
the RREQ by either re-broadcasting it or replying with
a DSR Route-Reply. If the intersection of the avoid list
and the DSR route in the RREQ packet is non-void (i.e.
a node which was requested to be avoided is in the route),
the RREQ packet is suppressed. Similarly, a DSR Route-
Reply (RREP) is honored only if the route in the RREP
does not contain a node in the locally-maintained faulty
list. Otherwise, the RREP is simply dropped.
In this way, each node along the route makes its own
local decision about nodes to trust, and a node has control
only over routes that go directly through it. Nodes may
tamper with the avoid lists, in particular with a Rushing
Attack, but in Section 5 we describe the attack and show
through simulation results that the protocol is fairly robust
against this kind of avoid list tampering. The avoid list
could also be made tamper-proof with increased overhead,
in the context of cryptographically secure protocols.
Malicious Traffic Rejection: This module performs
the straight-forward function of rejecting traffic from nodes
it considers misleading. We employ the policy of rejecting
all traffic from a misleading node so that a node is not able
to relay its own traffic under the guise of forwarding it on
somebody else’s behalf.
Second Chance Mechanism: The Second Chance
Mechanism is intended to allow nodes previously consid-
ered misleading to become useful again. Without a second
chance, once a node is added to the faulty list, all future
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routes through it would be avoided, giving that node no op-
portunity to demonstrate its “goodness.” This may be un-
fairly harsh on a node, especially since the NeighborWatch
module is not guaranteed to be correct in its judgments.
A node may simply have been experiencing transient link
failures, or it may have needed to restart its network in-
terface. To account for such problems, we use a timeout-
based approach where a misleading node is removed from
the faulty list after a fixed period of observed inactivity.
Even though the node is removed from the faulty list, its
rating is not increased to neutral, so that it can quickly be
added back in the event of continued misbehavior. This
timeout value is called the Faulty Timeout.
4 Selfish Behavior
In this section we describe how OCEAN attempts to mit-
igate selfish routing behavior in ad hoc networks. The
general idea is to punish nodes for their selfish behavior,
by rejecting their traffic, in the hopes that this threat will
act as a deterrent.
Unfortunately, it can be hard to detect selfish behavior
through observations of the routing protocol itself, since
there are many undetectable techniques through which a
node can avoid becoming visible as a potential router. A
few examples of such manipulation of routing-related mes-
sages (specific to DSR), which can go undetected, are
1. Dropping the Route Request (RREQ). Inappropriate
dropping of RREQs can easily go undetected, since
RREQs are broadcast, are not acknowledged, and can
legitimately be dropped in some circumstances.
2. Adding too many nodes to the route in the RREQ
packet. If a node adds many other nodes to a RREQ
packet, the resulting path will appear to be undesir-
ably longer than paths through nodes that have not
tampered with the RREQ. The result is that paths
through such a nodes are unlikely to be chosen.
3. Adding a non-existent route in the RREQ packet. If a
node modifies the path in the RREQ such that it does
not exist, then traffic will not reach the misbehaving
node.
Because such manipulations of the routing protocol may
go undetected, if not otherwise secured through heavier-
weight cryptographic means, the best evidence of a node’s
cooperation is the actual number of packets it forwards. A
decision about whether to forward a node’s packet can be
based on its past forwarding performance. This creates a
loose packet-forwarding economy between nodes. Similar
economy-based approaches [7],[8], [17] require the use of
tamper-proof hardware modules or centralized bankers for
secure accounting.
OCEAN instead relies only on direct observations of in-
teractions with neighbors to measure their performance.
Every node maintains counters called chipcounts for each
neighbor. A chipcount can be thought of as a bank balance
in a bank hosted by the node that maintains the chipcount.
A node earns chips at a node upon forwarding a packet on
behalf of that node. Similarly, a node loses chips with a
node it asks the node to forward a packet. When deciding
whether to service a forwarding request, a node checks its
chipcount for that neighbor. If the chipcount falls below a
threshold, the node denies the request.
We have experimented with two trade-based schemes:
optimistic and pessimistic. In the optimistic scheme, a
node A increments the chipcount for a node B whenever
node B accepts a packet from node A, regardless of whether
B actually forwards the packet. The pessimistic scheme,
on the other hand, increments the chipcount for node B
only when node B is observed to forward the packet. In
both cases, node A will only know to ask B to forward
traffic if B has previously participated in the route request
protocol and is therefore on a route through A. If B fails to
forward A’s traffic at this point, then the NeighborWatch
module will detect the misleading behavior. The chipcount
scheme, instead, detects behavior where B selfishly asks A
to forward traffic, even if B has managed to escape being
on any routes through A.
The pessimistic scheme suffers from a deadlock problem
where two nodes may not forward packets for each other
for a long time because one node fails to observe the other
node forwarding a packet on his request. On the other
hand, an optimistic scheme could be too lenient on the
misbehaving nodes, since the chips for these nodes are in-
cremented even though the nodes do not forward packets.
This trade-based scheme may suffer from unfairness to
nodes on the periphery of the network. These nodes may
be punished because they do not receive sufficient oppor-
tunity to forward packets for others. This can cause the
throughput of the network to fall significantly, and it can
cause the network to “shrink” in upon itself as the interior
neighbors of the peripheral nodes themselves appear to be-
come peripheral nodes. To address this problem, we add
a tunable parameter called the Chip Accumulation Rate
(CAR). CAR is the rate at which all chipcounts in the
network are increased per unit time. Thus, even when a
neighbor does not forward any packets for a node, it will
eventually have a non-zero chipcount value and can thus
forward traffic at some reduced rate.
Setting an appropriate CAR value requires a trade-off.
An infinite CAR value would allow selfish nodes to enjoy
full freedom in relaying their packets, since they will never
run out of chips at any node. On the other hand, a zero
CAR value suffers from the unfairness to peripheral nodes
and the reduced network throughput for cooperating nodes
described above. In our simulations, using high mobilities
and a topology that places many nodes on the periphery,
we find that having a low CAR value punishes selfish nodes
much more than the cooperating nodes, which indicates
that at least the trade-off plays in our favor.
5 Simulation Results
In this section, we demonstrate that mitigating routing
misbehavior and selfish behavior through the use of direct
4
Number of Nodes 40
Maximum Velocity 20 m/s
Dimensions of Space 1500m x 300m
Nominal Radio Range 250m
Connection Life 8 packets
Min Connection Length 2 hops
Source Data pattern (each) 4 packets/second
Application Data Payload Size 64 bytes/packet
Raw Physical Link Bandwidth 2Mbps
Table 2: Parameters for OCEAN Simulations
observation of nodes can often be as effective as techniques
deploying second-hand node reputation. We first describe
our simulation environment and then go on to compare
the throughput of OCEAN in the presence of misleading
or selfish nodes against a network using second-hand rep-
utation information.
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Figure 1: Average Throughput of the Cooperating Nodes
for varying numbers of misbehaving nodes in the Network.
OCEAN can sustain a good throughput for high percent-
ages of misbehaving nodes.
We implemented OCEAN and its variants in GloMoSim
[28], a commonly-used simulator in the ad hoc research
community. These simulations model radio propagation
using the realistic two-ray ground reflection model and
account for physical phenomena such as signal strength,
propagation delay, capture effect and interference. The
Medium Access Control protocol used is the IEEE 802.11
Distributed Coordination Function(DCF). The parameters
we use for the simulations are given in Table 2. All results
have been plotted after taking an average over 20 simu-
lation runs. The ratio of the standard deviation and the
average was around 1.35 for highly mobile scenarios and
around 0.70 for low mobility scenarios. We simulate only
connections longer than two hops, since one-hop connec-
tions would artificially inflate our throughput figures (even
in the face of 100% misleading nodes, we would see some
throughput.) While the mobility model we simulate is not
as realistic as we could hope for, it is very commonly used,
making it possible for us to compare our work directly
against others’ results. We hope to test our ideas in other
models and real systems in the future.
We first consider the throughput of cooperating nodes
in OCEAN in the presence of varying numbers of mislead-
ing nodes and compare it to the same network without
OCEAN and also the same network without OCEAN but
in which the nodes are merely selfish rather than mislead-
ing (Figure 1). We make this latter comparison because
it helps us judge the potential utility of OCEAN. Any
misbehavior-detecting protocol should not be expected to
perform better than a network in which the nodes drop
packets but do not actively mislead other nodes. This is
because misbehavior detection can at most prevent nodes
from being misled by others; it cannot force the misbehav-
ing nodes to begin forwarding packets. We observe that
OCEAN performs drastically better than the same net-
work without OCEAN, and it can even sustain a perfor-
mance close to the defenseless network with merely selfish
nodes. It helps sustain 90% of the original throughput even
when 25% of the nodes misbehave. As the percentage of
the misbehaving nodes approaches 100%, the throughput
inevitably falls to zero. At lower numbers of misbehaving
nodes, OCEAN actually appears to perform better than
the network with merely selfish nodes. This is because
OCEAN also routes around nodes that drop packets be-
cause they are merely overloaded, not intentionally mis-
leading.
We next compare the performance of OCEAN to a pro-
tocol, SEC-HAND, that uses second-hand reputation in-
formation. SEC-HAND is intended to represent the family
of protocols that use second-hand reputation information.
SEC-HAND uses ALARM messages between nodes to
communicate information about misbehaving nodes (simi-
lar to those used in CONFIDANT [4]). We augmented the
DSR Route-Error Packet to contain an “Alarm” field. The
node in the Alarm field is advertised as misbehaving and
all nodes overhearing the Alarm add the accused node to
their respective faulty lists. SEC-HAND is otherwise like
OCEAN, to make it possible to compare the techniques
fairly.
We make our comparisons of OCEAN and SEC-HAND
across varying values of the Faulty Threshold and vary-
ing degrees of mobility (in Figure 2). We vary the Faulty
Threshold, because it controls the speed and the accuracy
of misbehavior detection. A small (by absolute value)
faulty threshold adds nodes faster to the faulty list, but
also suffers from the problem of false positives. A large
faulty threshold suffers from a slow detection speed. De-
tection speed is particularly important for OCEAN, since it
needs to evaluate new neighbor nodes from scratch. Hence,
faster detection should help OCEAN. SEC-HAND should
tolerate slower detection speeds, since it keeps records of
remote nodes and thus has more information available
when a new node joins the neighborhood. Accuracy, on the
other hand is critical for SEC-HAND, since SEC-HAND
can spread false information in the network if the detec-
tion was not accurate. OCEAN should be more resilient
to false detection, since bad information will be kept local.
We vary the degree of mobility, because we would expect
SEC-HAND to perform better than OCEAN in highly mo-
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Figure 2: Comparison of Direct Observation (OCEAN) and Using Second-Hand Information. The number of misleading
nodes is 10. The lower the Pause Time, the more mobile the network, with a zero Pause Time implying implies
continuous mobility.
bile scenarios. High mobility implies a quickly changing
neighborhood, and OCEAN nodes must must learn about
new neighbors from scratch. On the other hand, SEC-
HAND maintains ratings for remote nodes, which can be
helpful in quickly judging new local nodes that were pre-
viously remote.
From the results, we find that at high Faulty Thresh-
olds, SEC-HAND is indeed able to perform better than
OCEAN at high mobilities, as expected. On the other
hand, OCEAN outperforms SEC-HAND at low Faulty
Thresholds because SEC-HAND is much more suscepti-
ble to false positives. At high mobility, OCEAN is more
sensitive to the tuning of the Faulty Threshold parameter,
while SEC-HAND performs well over a broader range of
tunings. Both protocols perform better with lower mobil-
ity. Overall, if OCEAN and SEC-HAND both tune the
faulty thresholds to suit themselves, OCEAN can outper-
form SEC-HAND (even for highly mobile networks). We
conclude that, even in highly mobile networks, the network
can perform reasonably well without the need to exchange
second-hand information.
We further compare the performance of OCEAN and
SEC-HAND in the face of transient failures (weak links)
in Figure 3. Both of the protocols can incorrectly detect
such failures as misbehaving node behavior and over-react
accordingly. Because of this problem, OCEAN includes a
parameter called Faulty Timeout, which controls the idle
time before a neighbor declared misbehaving is given a
second chance and is elevated to the status of being non-
faulty (albeit with a low rating). Some protocols using
second-hand reputation information never give nodes a sec-
ond chance, but we also implement this feature in SEC-
HAND, to provide fair comparison. A concern, however,
is how quickly the protocols respond when the node given
a second chance still proves to be misbehaving. In SEC-
HAND, if the timed-out faulty node is multiple hops away,
we need to wait for another ALARM message before the
node is added back to the faulty list. In OCEAN, we only
detect misbehavior of direct neighbors, which allows us
to determine quickly, on subsequent traffic through them,
whether to put misbehaving neighbors back on the faulty
list. This is seen in a comparative degradation in SEC-
HAND’s performance at low Faulty Timeout values.
We next examine the vulnerability of OCEAN if it is de-
6
05000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
-300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0Av
er
ag
e 
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 o
f C
oo
pe
ra
tin
g 
No
de
s 
(B
yte
s/1
00
0s
)
Faulty Threshold
OCEAN. High Mobility Network
Faulty Timeout - 120S
240S
480S
1000S
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
-300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0Av
er
ag
e 
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 o
f C
oo
pe
ra
tin
g 
No
de
s 
(B
yte
s/1
00
0s
)
Faulty Threshold
SEC-HAND. High Mobility Network
Faulty Timeout - 120S
240S
480S
1000S
Figure 3: Average Throughput of Cooperating Nodes with varying Faulty Timeout and Faulty Threshold parameters
in High Mobility Scenarios (Pause Time=0). OCEAN is more resilient to lost information due to Faulty Timeouts.
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Figure 4: The figure shows how a rushing attack could be mounted by manipulating avoid lists. However, the attack
makes little difference in random ad hoc networks
ployed over a protocol that does not secure control packets
against tampering. The attack that a malicious node may
attempt is called a Rushing Attack [15], whereby a node
hurries a “tampered” route-request through itself. The
next node along the path will forward this tampered route
request and drop further instances of the same route re-
quest that come from other nodes. In this way, the mali-
cious node can establish a route through itself because its
route is the first seen by a downstream node, and it can
later drop the data packets sent through it. The Rushing
attack in OCEAN is illustrated in Figure 4. Note, though
that if node R in the illustration had been the destination,
the problem would have been avoided, since by default
DSR requires destination nodes to reply to all route re-
quests they receive. In that case, the good route would
have been found. However, in our simulations of random
networks, this attack seemed to make little difference. Fig-
ure 4 also shows the throughput of the network when the
malicious nodes tamper with the avoid lists. The through-
put remains reasonable, since for the attack to be possible
a relatively specific configuration of nodes is needed, which
does not occur frequently, at least in random ad hoc net-
works. There are many other ways a malicious node may
attack a network if the routing layer is not secured. How-
ever, we believe our experiments show that OCEAN does
not add any new vulnerabilities that should significantly
affect performance.
Another metric of evaluation for OCEAN is the through-
put of the misleading nodes. Ideally, we would like the
throughput of the misleading nodes to be as low as possi-
ble, to deter their behavior. Figure 5 plots the throughput
of the misleading nodes in defenseless, OCEAN, and SEC-
HAND networks. Unfortunately, we see that OCEAN is
not very effective in thwarting the throughput of the mis-
leading nodes. This is because the misleading nodes also
use OCEAN to route around other misleading nodes or
nodes that did not forward their packets. They were thus
able to maintain a good (and sometimes better) through-
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put even when the network was using OCEAN. Even in
SEC-HAND the misleading nodes are able to take advan-
tage of the SEC-HAND modules, however SEC-HAND is
better at punishing the misbehaving nodes, since the bad
reputation of the misbehaving nodes spreads much faster.
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Figure 5: Average Throughput of Misleading Nodes with
varying Faulty Threshold. The number of misleading
nodes is 5. Since the misleading nodes also use OCEAN,
they intelligently route around nodes that do not forward
their traffic.
We go on to examine the sensitivity of the throughput
of these misleading nodes to varying Faulty Threshold and
Faulty Timeout values. The results are in Figure 6. In-
terestingly, the throughput of the misleading nodes is al-
most constant with a varying Faulty Threshold. Since the
malicious nodes also use OCEAN with the same parame-
ters as the rest of the network, the positive and negative
effects of decreasing the Faulty Threshold almost cancel
each other out. On the other hand, increasing the Faulty
Timeout thwarts the throughput of the faulty nodes, as
one would expect, since the misleading nodes get fewer
second chances.
Finally, in addition to considering networks with mis-
leading routing behavior, we consider the performance of
networks containing merely selfish nodes. We study the
performance of the economy-based scheme proposed in
Section 4 in a simulation that places many nodes on the
periphery of the network (a 1500m by 300m rectangle).
This topology emphasizes the problems that our economy
scheme causes in terms of unfairness to peripheral nodes
and reduced throughput for cooperating nodes. Figure 7
plots the throughput of the cooperating nodes and the self-
ish nodes with varying chip accumulation rates (CARs)
under optimistic and pessimistic schemes.
At a low CAR value, the throughput of the cooperat-
ing nodes suffers a two-fold decrease, leading one to want
to tune CAR to higher values. On the other hand, the
throughput of selfish nodes changes by a factor of five to
six, leading one to want to tune CAR to lower values, to
adequately punish selfish nodes. Overall, we see that an
optimistic scheme better suits these trade-offs than a pes-
simistic scheme. An “optimum” CAR value, though, may
vary depending on network requirements, and there is no
good mechanism in our simple scheme for preventing in-
dividual nodes from tuning CAR to whatever value best
meets their selfish needs.
6 Authentication Issues
In the work we present in this paper, we assume that nodes
do not spoof each other’s identities, since this would al-
low misbehaving nodes to exploit the good reputation of
neighboring cooperating nodes. Since in reality it is easy
to spoof IP addresses and even MAC addresses, this would
imply the use of a cryptographically secure authentication
mechanism, perhaps as provided through a secure routing
protocol.
Unfortunately, we do not yet find a secure routing proto-
col that handles authentication in a manner that matches
the spirit of OCEAN in being truly ad hoc and also man-
ageably simple. Some secure routing protocols rely on pre-
assigned certificates from common certificate authorities to
authenticate nodes [25], but it may not always be possible
in truly ad hoc contexts for nodes to hold such pre-assigned
certificates from authorities that all nodes will respect. Ef-
forts to develop on-the-fly certificate authorities within the
network [15] [29] appear either to be quite complex or to
distinguish the role of certificate authority among a subset
of nodes, which does not provide complete decentraliza-
tion.
In OCEAN, we instead hope to give up the requirement
for stable identities for nodes at the routing level, and in-
stead merely prevent nodes from spoofing one another. To
achieve this objective, nodes generate their own asymmet-
ric key pairs, the public portion of which they can exchange
with neighbors, using them perhaps merely to agree upon
lighter-weight authentication secrets.
This mechanism, however, does not prevent a node from
generating multiple identities rapidly and then discarding
identities once the associated reputations have fallen below
threshold. To deal with such short-term identities, we hope
to leverage recent work on proof-of-effort mechanisms [1]
[11]. In the context of OCEAN, we could mandate that a
new identity be accepted only if the identity-owner shows
reasonable proof of recent effort in generating that identity.
This would not require nodes to maintain stable identities
for very long, but they would not find it advantageous
to cycle through them fast enough to cause much havoc
undetected.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presents the OCEAN techniques for detecting
and mitigating misleading routing behavior in ad hoc net-
works. Our goal was to study how far we can get using only
direct observations of neighbors. We find that this scheme
works surprisingly well, in terms of network throughput,
considering its simplicity compared to schemes that share
second-hand reputation information throughout the net-
work. Compared to such reputation schemes, OCEAN is
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Figure 6: Average Throughput of Misleading Nodes with varying Faulty Timeout and Faulty Thresh parameters. The
throughput of the misleading nodes increases with a decreasing Faulty Timeout, since a lower Faulty Timeout gives
the misleading nodes more chances. Note the drastically different scales on the vertical axes of the two plots.
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Figure 7: Throughput of the cooperating nodes and selfish nodes in the network with varying chip accumulation rates.
Number of selfish nodes=5. Note the drastically different scales on the vertical axes of the two plots.
more sensitive to the tuning of some parameters, and it
fails to punish misbehaving nodes as severely, but it per-
forms almost as well, and sometimes even better, across a
wide range of degrees of mobility.
We also find that our chipcount scheme provides a sim-
ple first step at being able to deter selfish behavior in the
network. However, this scheme is accompanied with net-
work throughput deterioration. Further work is warranted
to see if we can do a better job of using only directly-
observable information to identify and deter selfish nodes
without such significant reductions in the throughput of
cooperating nodes.
We also understand that our random simulation models
cover an unrealistically small sample of potential network
behavior. We would like to simulate other more realistic
models, and test our ideas in real systems if we have suffi-
cient resources to do so.
Finally, we plan to study how we can provide more effec-
tive infrastructure-free authentication in ad hoc networks
assuming that identities need not be entirely stable at the
routing level, but that spoofing of other nodes is unaccept-
able.
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